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TRANSCRIPT OF THE VIII NLSIR
SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION LAW

I. SESSION I: SECTION 3 AND DETERMINING
ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS
This session was moderated by Mr. Yaman Verma, Senior Associate, Shardul
Amarchand Mangaldas, New Delhi. He introduced the session by identifying the
key issues for discussion. They included what constitutes an anti-competitive
agreement, the kind of evidence required to establish such agreements, especially
in bid-rigging cases, and the kind of penalties imposed in such cases in light of
the decision in Excel Crop case'.
The first speaker of the Session was Dr. K.D. Singh, Deputy Director (Law)
at the Competition Commission of India. He began by highlighting how the CCI
had relatively less experience as an adjudicator of anti-competitive agreements
as compared to other jurisdictions. The MRTP regime which was previously in
force was motivated by different economic policy considerations. The opening-up
of the economy in the 1990s increased competition and ended the era of public
monopolies by opening up different sectors of the economy, eg: airlines, telecom,
banking, insurance etc.
The Competition Act thus came into being as a response to the need for regulating the market. It is for this reason that barring the decision in SAIL2, which
also primarily dealt with procedural issues, there is no established jurisprudence
on most substantive issues.
He then went on to analyse the construction of Section 3, which deals with
anti-competitive agreements, of the Competition Act. According to him the
charging Section, 3(1) should be seen in the light of Section 3(4) that provides
for "Competition in India". The charging section does not distinguish between
horizontal and vertical agreements and is thus very broad. Section 3(2) provides
for consequences making all such anti-competitive agreements void. Section 3(3)
provides that certain horizontal agreements may be presumed to have appreciable
2
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adverse effect even if they are not declared to be anti-competitive. The list is
therefore illustrative, and not exhaustive. Section 3(4) gives illustrations of certain
anti-competitive agreements which are vertical in nature, and declares them to be
anti-competitive with reference to Section 3(1). Therefore, while Section 3(3) has
a distinct character, insofar as it provides for a presumption, Section 3(4) breaks
no new ground. The same has been included only for abundant caution.
In light of this construction Dr. Singh highlighted the following issues.
The first question concerned the meaning of relevant market with regard to
anti-competitive agreements under Section 3. While the Competition Commission
has adjudicated on the term in cases of abuse of dominant position and combinations the question has not been before it in the context of anti-competitive
agreements. Adjudication concerning the scope of anti-competitive agreement
cannot take place in a vacuum. Instead, the market has to be kept as the focal
point. Questions including what would constitute the geographical market,
whether it would be pan-India or specific, are res integra and open to academic
interpretation.
The terms used in 3(1) and 3(4), 'in India' and 'within India', respectively,
do not provide much guidance as to what the geographical market ought to be.
According to Dr. Singh if a narrow view of the market is taken, all cartels, even
at the lowest levels, would fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission. This
would however overstretch the Commission. Thus, in his opinion, the market
ought to be pan-India but the Commission should look at specific sectors and
activities within India.
Another issue which he underlined was whether in interpreting Section 3
the Commission could adjudicate upon agreements if they were not covered by
either Section 3(3) or Section 3(4). An example of this was the Hiranandani
case3, where according to the agreement between the hospital and a stem cell
bank, patients of the hospital could only get stem cells from the bank in question. Being neither a vertical nor a horizontal agreement, it did not fall within the
scope of either Section 3(3) or Section 3(4). The Commission, however, adjudicated upon the issue by relying on Section 3(1). The reasoning was that 3(1) was
independent of 3(3) and 3(4) and was like a genus, thus not limited in its application to vertical or horizontal agreements. Sections 3(1) and 3(4) would be applied
in light of Section 19(4), and Section 3(3) would apply on its own. This case thus
overruled the decision in the ICICI Case which had previously held that Section
3(1) could not be invoked independently. The record thus has been set straight.
Section 3 makes the very act of entering into an anti-competitive agreement
an offence but no action upon it might be a mitigating factor while determining
3
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the question of penalties. Thus even if the parties do not act on it the agreement
still remains anti-competitive. In the Sugar Cartels case, the Commission however held that if the parties do not act upon an anti-competitive agreement the
same would not be hit by the rigours of Section 3, thereby taking a very liberal
approach.
Further, the standard of proof required to establish the anti-competitiveness of an agreement is preponderance of probabilities, in line with civil law,
even though the Act is quasi-criminal. Cartels these days act in a very sophisticated manner. Trade unions do not leave any traces even in their minutes. The
Commission however does not possess the powers of wire-tapping etc. Thus
according to Dr. Singh the Commission should be empowered with better tools to
go after anti-competitive agreements.
Finally, he considered the question of quantification of penalties. The issues
include in what circumstances should penalties be imposed or whether they
should be imposed at all. The Commission has discretionary and wide-ranging
powers in this regard which include cease and desist orders etc. The calculation
of turnover in terms of the relevant turnover or inclusive of the total turnover is
also an important issue with regard to penalties.
The next speaker was Mr. Rahul Singh, Assistant Professor, National Law
School of India University, Bangalore. He began by defining agreements.
Comparing the Competition Act and the Indian Contract Act, he said that while
agreements may be oral or written in both, in the former, the agreement need not
be intended to be legally enforceable, the same condition was absolutely essential
in the latter.
The focus should be on where the agreement locates itself in terms of its
economic effect. He highlighted the importance of the ostensibly contradictory
Cement case and Tyre case in this regard. In the Cement case, the primary evidence was 'parallel behaviour', which means acting similarly in terms of prices,
production and dispatch. Thus without any external influence if the behaviour
was similar, it would be considered as evidence of collusion. The cement company had contended that such similarity was not surprising since most of the
actions of the industry were governed by the government. During the MRTP era
of control, the government required companies to collect information on prices,
supplies and so on, and so the industry was only doing what the government had
asked them to do. The Commission, however, used the information exchange doctrine, which implies that if there was any information exchange about prices, a
cartel must have been formed.
In the Tyre case, the trade association had been collecting information about
tyre prices, which they claimed was for the reason of them wanting to file an
anti-dumping case. The law requires that, to file such a case, certain information
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must be collected. So, a similar defence of government authorisation, as taken
in the Cement case, was taken here. The Commission, however, held that while
information about the prices was collected, but was never disseminated. The collection by the advocate, was thus only for the purposes of filing the anti-dumping
case. Therefore, the agreement was not anti-competitive.
According to Mr. Singh, if seen from the point of view of law and economics
there is no actual contradiction between the two judgements, but only an apparent
conflict. He invoked Bill Clinton's defence against the charges of smoking marijuana ("I smoke marijuana, but I don't inhale it") as an analogy. The Commission
had said that there was nothing wrong with collection of information, as long as
it was not disseminated in an effort to distort the market. Hence, it is clear that
the focus was on the impact.
In this regard, Section 3 is justifiable in the sense that in the case of some
agreements, which are seen as extremely pernicious, entering the agreement itself
would be considered a violation, whether or not they had any tangible impact. So
pernicious, that the Commission does not want to waste time trying to understand what the impact might be.
The idea, thus, is that the inherent uncertainty due to information asymmetries
must continue in a market, the forces of demand and supply should always operate. Therefore, information exchange becomes a problem only if it seeks to
remove this uncertainty that exists in the market. From this point of view, the
Cement case and the Tyre case are on the same plane. They are only ostensibly
contradictory, but this can be reconciled when they are analysed from the law
and economics perspective.
Mr. John Handoll, Senior Adviser, European and Competition Laws, Shardul
Amarchand Mangaldas, New Delhi spoke next. He focussed on evidence gathering in bid-rigging cases. He started by alluding to how the use of the term
"nascent" with regard to the commission's jurisprudence appeared as an excuse
to justify mistakes. He maintained that the Commission, however remained, the
operation of very powerful forces.
The term bid-rigging has been defined by the OECD as a particular type of
price fixing behaviour by which firms co-ordinate their bids in procurement or
project contracts. This can take various forms, identical pricing, bid rotation, bid
suppression, market allocation, collective boycotts and compensation schemes.
Since 30% of the GDP is used in public contracts on an average, naturally, this
practice results in substantial social and financial harm.
To determine breach competition law looks at the serious nature of the consequences that bid-rigging agreements may have. The characteristics of the activity are also looked at. Finding information becomes difficult as the activity is
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conducted secretively. The enterprises and individuals suspected of bid-rigging
are, however, presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.
The Competition Act, effectively and broadly defines bid-rigging as any agreement which has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or
adversely affecting or manipulating the process of bidding. Thus a multitude of
problems have been covered. The agreement has also been broadly defined. In
fact, as Lord Denning said, "in some cases, a nod or a wink will do". The standard of proof is based on preponderance, unlike Ireland and England where the
criminal law standard of beyond reasonable doubt is applied. Due to this not even
a single case has been decided in those jurisdictions. In India, however, within
3 years, seven cases have been decided, most of which were confirmed as being
instances of bid-rigging. The COMPAT, though only looks at strong probability.
While considering evidence, in the absence of direct evidence of collusion, the
Commission can also look at and rely on indirect, circumstantial evidence of bid
rigging. It may infer such an agreement from a number of indicia which, taken
together may in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence.
Once this is established, a rebuttable presumption of an appreciable adverse effect
on competition arises.
In the LPG Cylinder Manufacturers case4 the Commission and the COMPAT
held that identical pricing itself was not conclusive proof of breach, and collusion
would be inferred where price of supplies differ and there is no explanation of
identical pricing. They also distinguished cases of identical pricing.
While it has been held that evidence of repeated identical pricing may suffice
for finding collusion, due to the serious nature of the offence such a finding cannot be reached without looking at supporting factors such as meetings between
bidders, existence of trade associations, filing of bids by the same person, same
handwriting, similar format for the cover letter, bidders visiting the contracting
body together, sharing of confidential documents, earning huge margins by quoting rates far in excess of costs etc.
Mr. Handoll also cautioned against the use of circumstantial evidence as the
same is less reliable especially when a civil law standard of proof is applied.
There has also been uncertainty on the exact burden of proof. He concurred with
the COMPAT's views that the standard of proof would increase depending on
how serious the event is. The Director General is best placed to evaluate evidence
however he only recommends the same to the Commission. The Commission can
file this and also obtain new evidence. The COMPAT on the other hand decides
cases on the basis of the Commission's orders and legal arguments before it. It
4
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does not usually examine witnesses. He concluded by however stating that the
Commission's body of practice is not unimpressive but the proof of the pudding
will be in the eating.
The last speaker for the session was Mr. Arjun Krishnan, Advocate, High
Court of Delhi. He spoke about penalties especially in the context of the decision in Excel Crop. Section 27 deals with penalties in case of contravention of
Sections 3 and 4. The first part of Section 27 talks about the cease and desist
order. The Commission may order the party found in abuse of dominant position
to discontinue such abuse and not re-enter such an agreement.
The second part of the provision states that the Commission may impose such
penalty, which is not more than the average turnover of the preceding three financial years. This penalty may be imposed upon each of the persons who are party
to the agreement. The legislature has thus clearly chosen to target the person and
not the body. In the case of cartels, the Commission has the option of proceeding under the proviso, which lays down that the producer/seller/distributor etc
included in a cartel may face a penalty three times their profit.
The decision in Excel Crop case dealt with bid rigging and allegations of boycott. The facts revolved around a large number of tenders issued for procurement
of aluminium phosphide. The commission held that the manufacturers were liable
under Sections 3(3) (a), (b) and, (d). The COMPAT also held them liable under
all three. By holding that it was a serious breach, compounded by the fact that
the material procured would have an impact on the PDS system the Commission
imposed a penalty of 9% on the average annual turnover which amounted to
about Z 63.9 crores. The Commission however failed to give any reasons for this
percentage. The COMPAT reduced the penalty and held that only the relevant
turnover, not the entire turnover had to be considered. The relevant turnover is
the turnover in respect of the goods in which breach was found. The COMPAT
thus reduced the penalty to Z 2.92 crores.
In arriving at this decision the COMPAT relied on the principles of foreign
law, particularly UK and the EU, and also on the decisions of the South African
Competition Appeals Court (SACAC). The SACAC had held that there had to be
a legislative link between the penalty and the contravention. This raised the question of whether there was any such thing in the Indian context. Section 27 can be
said to refer to the turnover or the entire profits of the enterprise. However, there
is scope for arguing both sides.
While the concept of relevant turnover may be applied, because the
Competition Act only sets an upper limit, without laying down a process on how
to fix a percentage the problem which arises is that the statute provides for "the
turnover".

VOL. 27

TRANSCRIPT OF THE VIII NLSIR SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITIONLAW

203

With regard to proportionality no guidelines have been framed by the
Commission on penalties other than for cases of leniency. The statute itself does
not give any further guidance on how penalty should be levied between zero
and ten percent. While like cases should be treated alike the question of what
constitutes a serious breach of competition law remains unanswered. Due to
the absence of any categorisation it is difficult to determine 'like' cases which
thereby creates a problem in levying penalties.
The relevant turnover standard seems to be proportionate. However, the problem is that COMPAT relied on the EU and UK standards to reach the above conclusion. In EU, a two step process is followed, apart from a basic fine a multiplier
is applied for the duration. If this process was followed in deciding the Excel
Crop case, the starting point would have been 10 -3 0 % of the relevant turnover
since this was a serious breach case. This would have been 9.72 crores in this
case. The multiplier for the three year duration would have been 29.16 crores.
Additionally 15-25% would be levied for deterrence thus amounting to Z 33
crores since adjustment, aggravating and mitigating factors are to be taken into
account. The impact on the PDS was an aggravating factor in this case. The penalty would be increased because the relevant turnover is a very small part of the
overall turnover. Therefore, total penalty would be Z 35 crores which would be
about 5% of the total turnover. In the interests of deterrence and proportionality,
Mr. Krishnan suggested the above as a useful standard.
This was followed by a question and answer session. With regard to quantifying penalties Mr Verma raised the question of whether relevant turnover could
be taken as s starting point and total turnover be considered a cap. Mr Krishnan
responded by saying that the same was not necessary and India could draw from
the experiences of other jurisdiction such as Australia where a three-tier system
was followed.
With regard to penalties, Dr. K.D. Singh observed that if the legislature
wanted to imply 'relevant turnover' thereby restring the Commission, they could
have done so, since the word 'relevant' has been used in several places in the
Act. But by not doing do, they have been very clear in their intention. According
to him by using the relevant turnover standard, the power of deterrence would be
lost. The EU uses 10-30% of the relevant turnover as a starting point, whereas
the CCI would be limited to 10% of the same. Further, finding the relevant turnover itself is a very difficult proposition. This would require micro-managing the
situation which was not feasible.
With regard to Mr Handoll's presentation Dr Singh observed that with respect
to public procurement, a new bill, the Public Procurement Bill had been introduced in which certain categories of cartels which affect the public have been
criminalised. This, according to him had not taken into account the difficulty of
establishing the existence of a cartel in cases even where a civil standard of proof
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was being utilized. He also commented that the outcome of the decision in the
Cement case was that nobody in the Cement industry has any data and even the
Commission was unaware of what was happening in it.
One of the members of the audience asked Mr Krishnan if buyers' cartels
could be brought within the ambit of cartels within India. He responded that he
was not sure how that would play out but, one way could be to see whether such
cartels could fall within the abuse of dominant position. Dr. K.D. Singh however
opined that such cartels are included within the Act. The Act provides an inclusive definition of cartels. While mostly only seller's cartels are included, it is possible to read in buyers' cartels too, especially when read with S. 3(3)(a) which
says, 'determines purchase or sale prices'. There was once a proposal to make
this explicit in 2003. But, even if the legislature did not act on this proposal, buyers' cartels would still be included. Mr Rahul Singh, on the other hand, argued
that the Act usually uses the term enterprise as the overarching term as to whom
it really applies to. When talking about cartels, it refers specifically to traders,
distributers etc. and not to an enterprise or a person, which would subsume buyers. Further, considering that the purpose of the Act is consumer welfare, there
was no reason to include buyer's cartels. This would turn the purpose on its head.
To this Dr. K.D Singh responded by saying that consumer welfare would, in fact,
be helped by this interpretation because buyers could use proviso to S. 3(3) as
cartels which are beneficial under 'joint venture' thus increasing efficiency and
creating a balance.
A guest also questioned the panel on whether Section 10 of the Indian
Contract Act, which includes unlawful consideration/object, be applicable to
a situation such as that which arose in the Hiranandani Case. Mr. Rahul Singh
responded by saying that Competition law does not care about consideration, because the focus is on the effect or the potential effect. In that sense, the
Competition Act pretty much over rides the contract law idea of an agreement.
Therefore, the two laws are not in pari materia.
Mr. John Handoll added that in the EU and Ireland, which followed the EU,
there is the concept of concerted practice, which did not exist in India. The keyword was thus collusion. The Act does not require the formal elements of agreement to be proved. A meeting of minds would be enough.
In response to a question on evidence required to prove parallel pricing
Mr. John Handoll remarked that by hook or by crook, the CCI and COMPAT
had managed to find bid-rigging in identical pricing cases. They had looked
at whether there had been identical pricing and whether this was explained by
things such as the same taxes, transport costs, supply costs etc. If no explanation
was available they had found the parties guilty.
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Mr Rahul Singh added that in India, parallel pricing itself was not enough to
show cartelisation because of the Hindustan Lever Corporationjudgement of the
Supreme Court from the MRTP era. According to him CCI was bound by this
judgement because of Article 142 of the Indian Constitution. This is why, in theory, they need to consider and prove 'plus factors'. The solution would be to take
the law and economics perspective, instead of taking the counterfactual test of
"what else could it have been?" The inquiry must see whether any of these entities had indulged in irrational behaviour.
II. SESSION II: ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
The second session focussed on the abuse of dominant position under Section
4 of the Competition Act. The session was moderated by Mr. Rahul Singh,
Assistant Professor, National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
The session began with Mr. Singh providing a general introduction of the
theme. The first speaker of the session was Mr. Rohan Arora, Senior Associate,
Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas, New Delhi. He dealt with the concept of relevant
market in detail and introduced the concept of dominance. He began by going
over the general scheme of a Section 4 inquiry under the statute where the first
important step is to identify the relevant market which includes both the relevant product market under Section 2(t) of the Act and relevant geographic market under Section 2(s) of the Act. Hence the relevant market would essentially be
the boundaries within which competitive forces act on an enterprise. One then
needs to examine whether the entity whose conduct is in question is dominant in
the said relevant market for which one needs to look into the factors listed under
Section 19(4) of the Act and finally, one has to examine if there has been any
abuse of the said dominant position by bringing it under one of the clauses of
Section 4(2) of the Act.
He explained this process of inquiry through the simple yet relatable example
of an ice cream seller on a beach. If he is the sole vendor of ice cream on the
beach and there are no other vendors in the vicinity close enough for the potential buyers to go to then he is the only enterprise in the relevant market for ice
cream (product market) on the said beach (geographic market) and hence he is
dominant. He can set the prices of his products independent of the operation of
any market forces on him. On the other hand if there are multiple ice cream vendors on the beach and the potential buyers have the option of going to any of
them then their mutual existence acts as a constraint on price setting by each of
them and no vendor can increase his price superlatively without fearing the loss
of customers and profits to other cheaper options available. Thus none of the vendors exist independent of the market forces and it can be said that none of them
are dominant in the market.
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After setting this strong conceptual foundation, Mr. Arora proceeded to elucidate how the Competition Commission of India had followed an inconsistent
approach while defining relevant market for the purposes of a Section 4 inquiry.
This inconsistency was illustrated by citing examples of three very well known
cases where the Commission had passed orders under Section 26 of the Act. In
the Arshia Rail case, the Commission defined the relevant market very broadly
by holding that that the transportation of goods by railways and by roadways
was a part of the same relevant market. On the other hand in the DTH case the
Commission held that DTH and Cable TV supplies belonged to separate relevant
markets without giving any cogent reasons for such a narrow definition or distinguishing this from the earlier case. Finally in the Apple v. Vodafone case the
commission again defined the relevant market broadly to include all smart phones
regardless of the brand without explaining the change in its approach. He further
explained a special case of defining relevant markets in the case of after markets
in the Auto Spare-partscase where the Commission held that the market for after
sales services for automobiles like spare parts, servicing etc. was different from
the market for sale of automobiles as the buyers of automobiles while making the
decision to buy a particular vehicle did not take into consideration the price of
the after sales services and hence they could not be included in the same relevant
market.
Mr. Arora then referred to the SSNIP test as the most frequently used test
for defining relevant markets for the purposes of competition law worldwide.
He explained that the test relied upon analyzing whether or not a Small but
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price of a particular good (SSNIP - usually taken to be a 5 -10% increase in price) would make the consumers shift away
from the good to its competitors. If the consumers would in fact shift away to the
substitute then the good in question and its substitute belonged to the same relevant market according to the SSNIP test and if there was no shift then the two
goods belonged to different relevant markets. He further added that by applying
the SSNIP in certain instances while not applying it in other cases to avoid dealing with complex mathematical data, the Commission was clearly proving to be
consistent in its inconsistent approach.
The real estate market was taken as another example of the often contradicting and thereby unpredictable stance of the CCI. While in some cases the commission held that the totality of the NCR region was one relevant market for the
development of real estate for residential purposes, in other cases it restricted the
scope of the relevant market only to the territory of Gurgaon and further in some
instances to specific housing projects in Gurgaon. Mr. Arora pointed out that
such an erratic approach by the Commission left nothing for the real estate developers to rely on to self regulate their conduct so as to remain on the right side of
competition law. The same was also pointed out by the Director General of the
Competition Commission who stated the confusion on the subject must not come
as a surprise when there are four different approaches of determining the relevant
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market in four different decided cases by the Commission each with identical
precedential value.
Global markets was another issue that came up in the discussion of defining
relevant markets. The Commission was criticized by the speakers for not considering the effect of imports on competition in the market. Often the Commission
did not take into consideration the fact that although the market in India only
consisted of one enterprise, substitutes of the product were also imported into the
country. With import duties at an all time low, the constraining effect of such
imports on the exercise of dominance by a firm needed to be taken into consideration before imposing anti-competitive liability under Section 4.
With this Mr. Arora wrapped up discussion on relevant markets and moved
on to discuss the second step under the scheme of Section 4, i.e. the dominance
of an enterprise in the relevant market. He described dominance as a position
of strength enjoyed by a firm that allowed it to operate independently of market
forces. Section 19(4) of the Act lists the factors that need to be taken into consideration to assess dominance in the relevant market. He remarked that dominance
in the market came with the huge burden on the dominant enterprises as it is
assumed that since their position already has a distorting effect on the market,
such firms had the added responsibility of ensuring that they did not do anything
which would distort the market further, which in essence was what Section 4 of
the Act sought to guard against. He cited the example of the T-series case where
the Commission held T-series to be dominant in the relevant market under the
factors listed in Section 19(4) and also because it could conduct itself in the market with respect to prices and output in a manner that other firms could not. This
was a clear indication of how T-series existed independent of competitive forces
in the market and was therefore dominant. Mr. Arora concluded by warning
against superficial analysis of dominance and advised that the Commission must
carefully consider all the relevant factors under 19(4) before concluding whether
or not an enterprise is in fact dominant in the market.
The next speaker was Mr. H.S. "Bobby" Chandhoke who is a Senior Partner
at Luthra and Luthra Law Offices. He further expounded on the concept of
dominance which was introduced by the previous speaker. Mr. Chandhoke
captured the dynamics of competition law succinctly when he began by stating that competition law involved the interplay of accounts, economics and law
in a very unique manner. Adding to the long list of examples that illustrated
the Commission's inconsistent approach, Mr. Chandhoke remarked that the
Commission had also been inconsistent in its approach of exempting certain government bodies from anti-competitive liability under the privilege of 'sovereign
functions'. In the recent PWD Activity case the Commission accepted the sovereign functions immunity and did not hold the state department liable under the
Act. However, in another case it held the Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion in breach of the Act for certain FDI policies it considered akin to
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licensing and hence not protected under the sovereign functions immunity. Mr.
Chandhoke however remarked that this contradictory approach could be corrected
by looking for guiding principles on the doctrine of sovereign immunity in common law and applying those principles to competition law.
Moving to another contentious issue on the subject of abuse of dominant position, Mr Bobby referred to the recent DLF case where the Commission found
the realtor giant DLF abusing its dominant position in the market for development of residential apartments and imposed a penalty of Z 630 crores on it which
was affirmed by the COMPAT. He raised the pertinent question, which was
also raised by Mukhopadhyay J., of why the DLF matter was not being treated
as a case of consumer dispute, with the redressal mechanism set up under the
Consumer Protection Act being the appropriate forum to look into the matter. He
echoed the learned Justice's words when he asked how DLF's conduct could be
considered 'anti-competitive' even if it was clear that the conditions imposed by
it on the consumers could clearly be termed as unfair. He pointed out that this
question had come up in EU jurisprudence on Competition Law and had been
settled conclusively to the point that it was necessary to show that the unfair conduct affecting consumers was as a result of distortion of competition in the market. Without displaying this vital middle step of anti-competitive conduct of an
enterprise leading to the imposition of unfair advantages, the conduct could not
be referred to the competition watchdogs but would have to be referred to the
appropriate consumer disputes redressal body.
Mr. Chandhoke then moved on to the controversial issue of whether or not an
analysis of Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) was required to
be proved to impose anti-competitive liability under Section 4 of the Act. Here
again while the Commission had held in numerous cases that an AAEC analysis
was not required in a Section 4 inquiry, the COMPAT had in other cases stated
that in order to prove discriminatory practices under Section 4(2) an AAEC analysis was mandatory. He further commented that while it was true that significant
divergences existed in the practice of competition law in the US and in the EU
and the Commission had a propensity to follow the EU position of law, it had
shown inconsistencies in this approach too.
As a solution to this problem of inconsistency and unpredictability which
emerged as an issue that all speakers in the session had consensus on, Mr.
Chandhoke put forward the proposal for creating a set of guidelines for the application of each penalising section under the Act. He added that since these guidelines would be only recommendatory in nature and not set in stone they could
be modified and updated to keep pace with the changes in the nature of the
economy and the market. They would serve as a useful tool for the practitioners of Competition law as well as the industry which was most vulnerable to the
lack of consistency in the Commission's orders. He concluded on a lighter note
by commenting that if the Commission was reluctant to take up the initiative,
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practitioners, like him, would be more than happy to draft these guidelines and
submit them to the Commission for its approval. This would at least save the
unsuspecting industry from living under the fear of having penalties as large as
10% of their annual turnover being imposed on them without a warning.
The third and final speaker for the session was Mr. Krishnan Venugopal,
Sr. Advocate, Supreme Court of India. Mr. Venugopal dealt with the essential
facilities doctrine under both Section 3 and Section 4 of the Act. He began by
pointing out the origin of the doctrine was in the US with respect to cases on
combinations and not those dealing with anti-competitive agreements or abuse
of dominant position. The question that arose was if a monopolist or a group of
enterprises together controlled a resource, access to which was indispensable for
another enterprise to operate in a downstream market, how best would competition law deal with the matter.
As a background to the question, Mr. Venugopal described some leading
cases in the US that dealt with the issue and threw up a number of questions
that practitioners of competition law are still grappling with. The first case was
the Terminal Railroadcase. In this case, a few railroad companies controlled the
only bridge across the Mississippi river and refused to allow access to it to their
competitors making it impossible for them to enter into the business of providing
railroad services on that route thereby effectively establishing monopoly of those
companies that controlled the bridge. The US Supreme Court mandated access in
this case.
The next case cited by Mr. Venugopal was the Auto-tail Power case where a
power generating company operating in Dakota as well as Minnesota also controlled the power distribution grid. When some towns wanted to generate and
distribute their own power at lower costs, they were unable to do so as the distribution grid was controlled by the company which refused access to the same.
This conduct was held to be anti-competitive and the court mandated the company to grant access to the distribution network.
The next case cited by Mr. Venugopal was the famous judgment of the US
Supreme Court in the Aspen Skiing case. In this case, the owner of a skiing
resort on one of the four slopes bought resorts on two more slopes and therefore in effect controlled three of the four skiing slopes which were collectively a
major skiing attraction for tourists from around the world. The owner of the three
resorts then wanted to opt out of the common four slope ticket scheme which was
generally bought by tourists and the same would have harmed the profits of the
owner of the fourth slope. The US Supreme Court although not expressly using
the essential facilities doctrine, held that the conduct of the owner of the three
slopes was in fact an abuse of his dominant position and mandated him to continue participating in the multi-slope ticket scheme.
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However in the Trinko case the US Supreme Court knocked down the essential
facilities doctrine to very large extent on the basis of an article written by Prof.
Areeda where he argued that the doctrine must only be used in the rarest of rare
cases where it was impossible to enter into a particular market without access to
a resource controlled by a firm or a group of firms collectively. Further a clear
intent to exclude rivals by denying access must also be proved. According to Mr.
Venugopal the rarest of rare doctrine is a very subjective standard and very susceptible to a slippery slope of arguments. In this subjectivity, the only lodestone
according to him is the analysis of static notions of consumer welfare and allocative efficiency. Further explaining what he meant by allocative efficiency, Mr.
Venugopal explained that wherever monopoly profits were available to the market players, new entrants would enter the market increasing supply till all the
monopoly profits were eliminated and only normal profits similar to those present
in other sectors of the same economy prevailed. According to him, this standard could be applied to analyze whether a monopoly existed in the market and
whether the same was being abused to draw and sustain monopoly profits.
Commenting on the application of the essential facilities doctrine by the
Competition watchdogs in India in the Schott Glass case, Mr. Venugopal
explained how the COMPAT held that access to a particular kind of glass which
was required to make certain articles but was only manufactured by one enterprise in the country which was denying access could not be a case of application of the essential facilities doctrine if the said glass could easily be imported
at economically viable rates and in fact a competitor in the downstream market
was already doing so. Mr. Venugopal, agreed with the reasoning of the COMPAT
in the Schott Glass case stating that an enterprise controlling assets must not be
forced to make the same available to its competitors at competitive rates as such
an enforcement reduces the incentives for firms to develop more efficient and
profitable resources in the long run. If the courts tried to regulate access in every
case through orders of continuing mandamus, ensuring compliance with the same
would end up being a tedious and resource consuming task.
In the US the position of law as it currently stands is that the market must
be allowed to self-regulate in matters of access to important monopoly creating
resources. Even in cases of difficult to break natural monopolies, technology or
other factors would eventually play the role of a balancing factor and prevent sustained monopolization. The Commission has followed this position broadly and
has been reluctant to apply the essential facilities doctrine to mandate access,
as was seen in the Schott Glass case. Further even in the Arshia Rail case the
Commission did not mandate access to the rail terminal to the newer rail owners
stating that developing their own terminals was in fact their duty under the contract authorising operation.
Finally, Mr. Venugopal provided a hypothetical from the ongoing case of
Indian Trade Promotion Organisation (ITPO) where the commission had
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imposed a penalty of Z 6.75 crore on ITPO, the body that owns and manages
Pragati Maidan and holds a large number of trade fairs at the venue, which is
located in the heart of Delhi. In this case, the Indian Exhibition Promotion
Organisation, a body of exhibition organisers, venue owners and service providers complained that ITPO had imposed certain stipulations related to "time gap
restriction" on it between two successive exhibitions "having similar product profiles/ coverage". The exhibitor's body had alleged that these restrictions and the
amendments were arbitrary. It said that ITPO "adversely affected the established
exhibitions of other players in the market by scheduling its own unrecognized
exhibitions and refusing the permission to other players on the pretext of arbitrary time gap restrictions."
The Commission said that the relevant geographic market in the instant case
would be the geographic area of Delhi and the relevant product market would
be the market of providing venue for trade fairs/ exhibitions etc. Accordingly,
the relevant market in the instant case would be the market providing venue for
trade fairs/ exhibitions within the geographic area of Delhi. This clearly showed
the kind of armchair analysis that the Commission was indulging in. In Mr.
Venugopal's opinion, this was a fit case for the application of the essential facilities doctrine. However, the Commission merely indulged in an armchair analysis and said that the capital was the most important place to hold such fairs and
denial of access by ITPO meant that they abused their dominant position in the
market. They failed to appreciate the fact that Mumbai hosted more trade fairs
than Delhi and that there were several other grounds capable of holding large
fairs in and around Delhi NCR. Accordingly, Mr. Venugopal's question was
whether and where an essential facilities doctrine claim could lie in the instant
case.
The presentation was followed by a lively question answer session. The first
question for the session was whether the Commission was shifting the burden
of defining the relevant product and geographic market onto the Supreme Court.
Mr. Chandhoke agreed with the participant and further said that there was a gap
between the approaches undertaken by the two institutions due to the inconsistency in the acceptance of legal arguments by them. This was followed by a question regarding the applicability of SSNIP test in the ITPO case. Mr. Venugopal
was of the opinion that the SSNIP test wouldn't have utility in the instant case
due to the nature of the market. This was because, exhibitors would not move out
of Pragati Maidan even after a small increase in prices. He expressed surprise at
the fact that the Commission had failed to inquire into the question of dominance
and merely accepted ITPO's position that it was a dominant enterprise. At this
juncture, Mr. Rahul Singh pointed out that the words "shall have due regard to"
in Section 19(4) imposed an obligation on the commission to go into the question
of dominance even if the parties failed to argue it. According to him, this was
further supported by the fact that the Commission had itself accepted in previous
cases that it was an inquisitorial and not an adversarial body. It was also pointed
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out that the determination of relevant market should not be based on an armchair
analysis i.e. it shouldn't depend on what the Commission thinks what the market
is.

He also went on to point out instances where the Commission had said that
it was not important for them to conduct an inquiry as it would be too expensive given the lack of data. Something similar happened in the ITPO case when
Justice Singhvi chided the DG for not sending a questionnaire to other trade fair
grounds to find the number of trade fairs hosted by them and the revenue generated as a result of the same. Thus, this brought back the point that there was
need to develop a standard manual so that there was less inconsistency in the
DG's approach. The DG should be told the steps that he necessarily needs to go
through for the determination of a relevant market. All the panellists agreed that
India could take a leaf out of the WTO Appellate Body directions in this regard.
The WTO has mandated that all relevant factors need to be addressed while conducting inquiry and if there is a failure to address even one determinant, the
whole finding gets knocked off. The panellist lamented the absence of principles
of natural justice, the lack of proper hearings and the inconsistent procedures
followed by Commission. This had the effect of Senior Advocates refusing to
appear before the Commission which has denied it a substantial legal acumen and
expertise.
The next question was regarding the applicability of the dynamic efficiency
argument in the Auto Spare-parts case. In response, it was said that dynamic
efficiency would be difficult to apply holistically in that case due to the low volumes of most of the car manufacturers. It could be applied only to the large volume players like Maruti Suzuki or Hyundai but not to all the manufacturers. The
manufacturers have continuously argued that they want to control after sale services in order to ensure quality so as to preserve their brand value. In such a
scenario, essential facilities doctrine could have been argued only if access was
allowed in the past and then was suddenly denied.
The next question was whether the concept of collective dominance, if it had
been a part of the Indian competition law jurisprudence could have been used to
address the issue of relevant market in cases such as DLF? Mr. Chandhoke was
of the opinion that the presence or absence of collective dominance will not solve
the problem of relevant market as the question of collective dominance arises at
the second stage of a Section 4 inquiry while the determination of relevant market is conducted in the first stage itself. He further said that the Commission is
playing the role of a consumer regulator in such cases as it wants to set an example for other builders to not harass consumers without going into the question of
the effect on competition. Mr. Arora added that such cases should also be analysed from the perspective of the presence of unfair terms in a contract as a mere
competition law analysis might not depict any fault on part of the builders.
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A query was raised regarding the definition of relevant market in cases involving abuse of dominance over online space. The issue was whether the relevant
market will be restricted to the online space or will it cover the total market of
that good. Mr. Chandhoke replied by referring to the Snapdeal case to point out
the fact that online and offline retailers are not part of a different market and that
the market is consolidated. This is due to the fact that offline retailers also sell
online and vice versa. Further, it has been said that the relevant market cannot
be restricted to a particular phone or a book and the market would be the larger
phone or book market.
The last question was would BCCI's action in ousting ICL and replacing it by
IPL have amounted to an abuse of dominance if the Act was in force at that point
in time. The panellists were of the view that such an action might not result in
the finding of an abuse of dominance as the Hockey Association got off in a similar case of Hockey Leagues.
III. SESSION III: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
CLEARING THE CCI HURDLE AND THE
COMPETITION BETWEEN REGULATORS
The moderator, Ms. Vatsala Sahay, Associate, Agram Legal Consultants,
Mumbai introduced the subject matter of the session. She gave context to the
session by describing the role of the Competition Commission with respect to
Mergers and Acquisitions, and how the Commission had started playing a more
pro-active role over the past few years. She briefly discussed the Jet-Etihad case,
the Holcim Pharmaceuticals case and the Sun Pharma-Ranbaxy case. She then
invited the first speaker for the session, Mr. Tarun Mathur, Manager, Ernst and
Young LLP to begin the discussion.
Mr. Mathur gave a presentation on key competition law trends and analysis.
His presentation was divided into four sections - first, developments in competition law jurisprudence; second, actual trends in filings; third, decisional practice
of CCI and last, procedure regarding remedies.
He began with a historical account of the mergers and acquisition regime
under the Competition Act, 2002. When the Act was passed in 2002, there was
no provision for compulsory filing. It was up to the discretion of parties concerned. This situation was rectified when the Competition Act was substantially
amended in 2007, to include provisions for a suspensory regime and compulsory
filing. Under the present regime, a combination that satisfies the monetary thresholds under the Act needs to be compulsorily notified to the CCI by the concerned
parties. The CCI will then look at various factors under Section 20(4) to determine whether the combination has an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition
("AAEC") and pass an appropriate order.
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Following a deal with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the combination regulations were passed in 2011, exempting certain acquisitions and combinations for
the requirement of compulsory notification. However, Mr Mathur pointed out several issues with these regulations. First, the use of the terminology "ordinarily not
likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition" leaves it to the wisdom
of the parties as to whether they should file or not, thereby creating ambiguity.
Further, the use of the term "local nexus", which was later changed to "insignificant local nexus", in Schedule I of the Competition Act is problematic. The provision regarding Joint Ventures is based on a concept note prepared by the South
African Commission, exempting greenfield ventures while requiring notification
of brownfield ones. Mr Mathur pointed out that the Act has been amended thrice
and the fourth round of amendments was underway.
Mr Mathur then moved on to discuss the actual trends in filings. He pointed
out that out of 252 notifications filed with the Commission, 242 had been
approved. While commending the performance of the short-staffed CCI, Mr
Mathur pointed out that most of the filings had involved only technical analysis.
He pointed out that the trends show that the number of filings is increasing at the
rate of 10 filings a month, with the majority of cases in 2012 being under Section
5C. A sector-wise analysis revealed that there was no specific sector which had
the dominant share of filings. Mr Mathur commented on how the suspensory
regime of the Act was borrowed from the European Commission and Federal
Trusts Commission and how the provision for pre-merger consultation had its origins in the SEBI Informal Guidance Scheme. During pre-merger consultation, the
Competition Commission addresses both procedural and substantive issues. Mr
Mathur clarified that the opinion expressed in these consultations is not binding
on the Commission.
Mr Mathur then discussed the procedural timeline for filing. The notification
must be filed within 30 days of the trigger date, after which the Phase I review
must be completed within 30-60 days. Therefore, there is a Phase II review,
which is conducted by the Commission itself or is outsourced to the Director
General. The duration for the Phase II review is 210 days. However, this figure is
misleading because the Commission frequently stops the clock when it is in need
of a paper or approval. Out of 252 filings, the Commission has stopped the clock
on 178 occasions. Mr Mathur attributed such delays to shortage of manpower in
the Commission, lack of adequate training, failure of the parties to submit the
relevant documents and demand for irrelevant documents like minutes of board
meetings. However, he did point out that the time limit of 210 days has been
exceeded in only 6 cases, which involved hefty divestment.
Mr Mathur also raised a question of why notifications were filed only 20-25
days after the trigger date. According to him, this could be attributed to concerns regarding confidentiality and the fact that competition lawyers were consulted only after other elements of the corporate deal were finalized. Ms Vaishali
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Sharma pointed out the difficulty in getting the documents together. Mr Rajat
Sethi highlighted the duplication of forms and the need for streamlining. While
concurring with the other panelists, Mr Mathur gave the suggestion that the work
of the Competition Commission ought to be clearly demarcated between cases
brought under Sections 3/4 and Sections 5/6.
Continuing his discussion on trends in filings, Mr Mathur pointed out that
60% of filings involved foreign enterprises. Mr Rajat Sethi pointed out that
this was reflective of the fact that foreign companies are more likely to notify
the Commission than Indian companies. However, other panellists disagreed
with him on this point. Further, Mr Mathur highlighted that 84% of the filings
involved vertical or horizontal overlaps and therefore, had no possibility of causing AAEC.
Mr Mathur then moved on to discuss the decisional practice of the
Commission. He first commented on the trend of claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction over transactions, which are conducted outside India but have some
Indian nexus. He gave the example of how even when an entity has earned revenue in the United States of America, if such revenue is included in the entity's
Consolidated Financial Statement, it must be considered while filing. Further, he
also highlighted how the Commission has taken an expansive view of its mandate by effecting a modification of the combination agreement in two cases. In
the Hospira case, the duration of the non-compete clause in the agreement was
changed from 8 years to 4 years and in the GDNL case, the agreement which
contained clauses favouring GDNL was modified.
Finally, Mr Mathur talked about the practice and procedure of the Commission
regarding remedies. He specifically discussed the Sun Pharma Ranbaxy case,
where the combined market share of the companies would become 85-90 % and
therefore, the companies were ordered to divest 7 drugs. Mr Mathur criticized
the language used in the order where the Commission said that they "think" the
combination is bound to abuse their dominant position, without entering into an
objective analysis of the same.
The second speaker of the session was Mr. Yaman Verma, Senior Associate,
Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas, New Delhi. He spoke about the interpretation of
'control' and Schedule I exemptions. Mr Verma began by pointing out a loophole in the Competition Act, 2002 viz. if one were to buy a share in DLF, it
would amount to acquisition under Section 5. The realization of this loophole is
what led to the enactment of the Combination Regulations in 2011. Schedule I
of the Regulations lists the transactions that do not cause an appreciable adverse
effect on competition. The first of these comes into play if the total shareholding is less than 25% and has been made solely for investment purposes and is in
the ordinary course of business. However, as Mr Verma highlighted, there have
been cases where the CCI has required the parties to file a notification even when
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up to 1% shares were being acquired on the ground that other requirements for
invoking this exemption have not been met.
For example, in the SAAB Pipavav decision, acquisition of less than 4% shares
was required to be notified, as it was not in the ordinary course of business and
not for investment. Due to the pre-existing strategic technology partnership,
the acquisition of shares was likely to lead to a greater degree of control being
exercised in the target company. Mr Verma used this case to demonstrate that
in cases of a pre-existing relationship, there are greater chances of acquisition of
control and thus requirement of a notification.
Mr Verma also discussed a case wherein Kotak Maindra Bank was required
to make a filing for acquiring a 15% stake in MCX as it had an existing 40%
shareholding in a rival commodity exchange. CCI grounded this in the argument
that companies would not invest in two rival commodity exchanges and thus
this may involve an attempt to acquire control. However, Mr Verma expressed
his disagreement with this finding of the Commission. Similarly, he also cited
the deal between Mylan Inc. and Abbott Laboratories wherein the Commission
required a notification even when the stake being acquired was less than 25% as
some shares were already owned in the target company. In the Network 18 case,
the Commission held that control is the ability to exercise control over strategic important decisions and even if the company acquires veto rights, the same
amounts to control. Further, the definition of 'group' in the Competition Act is
important, as a notification is required to be filed even if the target company is a
foreign company but it controls an Indian company.
Mr Verma summed up the discussion of the cases by highlighting that 'ordinary course of business' and 'for the purpose of investment' have been looked at
very narrowly. By and large the notifications have been clear because there is no
change in the control of the company. Further, the Commission has never taken it
upon itself to say that someone is exempt from making a filing and have returned
a filing. Mostly, the companies make the filings as a precautionary measure.
The third speaker of the session was Mr. Rajat Sethi, Partner, S&R Partners.
Mr. Rajat Sethi focused his discussion on the Jet-Etihad case. He began with a
contextual introduction to the case. He talked about why Etihad did not want to
have control over Jet. Under the International Air Transport Agreement, a contracting state can withdraw privileges enjoyed by a company under the treaty
if its nationals do not substantially own it. Etihad was worried that if it were
deemed to acquire control over Jet, it would lose its treaty privileges.
Etihad had acquired 24% stake in Jet as well as certain rights such as the
rights to nominate two Directors. The SEBI ruled that Etihad had not acquired
control. However, the Competition Commission, considering a prior Commercial
Cooperation Agreement between Jet and Etihad, came to the conclusion that
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there was acquisition of control. Mr Rajat Sethi suggested that there should be
harmonization of the meaning of 'control' across regulators. He pointed out that
the FDI Policy had been recently amended to bring the definition of control in
parity with the definition under the SEBI Takeover Guidelines. At the same time,
he accepted that differences across regulators may be permitted, owing to different objectives of regulators. Mr Rajat Sethi concluded on this point that the
Competition Commission conducted a reasonably fair assessment of Etihad's
acquisition of control, and hence, was right in subjecting it to the requirement of
greater scrutiny.
In response to suggestion made by the Moderator, about having one definition
for all regulators, Mr Rajat Sethi disagreed. He said that a definition adopted by
a regulator must suit the objectives of the regulator and must be an inclusive one,
so as to not leave out any unaddressed situations. However, he suggested that in
order to bring some clarity as to when acquisition of control occurs, the example of USA could be emulated, where a clear distinction is made between protective and participative rights. Mr Yaman Verma agreed, suggesting the creation
of a list, which enumerated rights that certainly would not amount to control. All
panellists concurred on this suggestion, agreeing that it would serve as a useful
guideline for regulators.
The 4 th panellist for the session was Ms. Vaishali Sharma, Proprietor, Agram
Legal Consultants, Mumbai who spoke about the importance and impact of
merger control regulations.
Reflecting on the discussions initiated by the previous speakers, she highlighted that there are multiple interpretations possible for every law and it is these
ambiguities that ultimately favour lawyers. She began by discussing offshore
transactions. A filing is required to be made if certain thresholds are breached.
Primarily, two tests are followed: first, the 'Parties test' which considers the
assets and turnover of the target, and further the existence of an 'India element'
i.e. whether a minimum 750 crores in India will be acquired; and second, the
'Group test- under which if the deal involves a series of transactions, then the
CCI would look at not just the de minimis transactions but the entire group. For
example, in the case of a joint venture transaction in steel business based entirely
in India, the European Commission, China, Korea and Thailand also required filings to be made as Mitsui and Samyo (parties involved in the transaction) had
turnover in these jurisdictions.
Further, the deals are often structured in a manner that would make them
exempt from filing. However, the Competition Commission has declared that it
will be looking at the substance and not the structure of the transaction to determine whether a filing is required or not. She opined that the Commission requires
a notification even in case of offshore transactions as it does not want to be left
behind when the regulators of all other countries are exercising jurisdiction. For
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example, in the KKR AT Dutch BV and KKR AT Auxially Dutch BV deal was
a completely offshore transaction but the Commission still exercised jurisdiction
and required a notification.
IV. SESSION IV: THE INTERFACE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION LAW
The moderator, Mr. Rohan Arora, Senior Associate, Shardul Amarchand
Mangaldas emphasized on the need to link Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Law in India to what is happening in the global scenario.
The first speaker of the session was Murali Neelakanthan, Amicus. Mr.
Neelakantan asserted that the nexus of Intellectual Property Rights ("IPR") with
Competition Law had not been focused on much in India, and limited his speech
to the healthcare industry. He warned against the absurd results that would
ensue if principles from other sectors would be imputed to the healthcare sector,
thereby affirming its specific nature. According to Mr. Neelakantan, the healthcare system in India works differently from the system in Europe or even the
United States of America. Governments provide free healthcare in Europe, and
this makes for a crucial difference - the government buys the medicines. For all
intents and purposes, the government becomes the market. This is because the
government not only buys the medicines, but has the power to decide the sale and
purchase of medicines. Thus, the clash is between two heavyweights - big pharmaceutical companies and government healthcare. These two entities can negotiate effectively, and reach an equitable equilibrium.
The same scenario is played out in the United States of America between
insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies. The situation in India however is quite different. Neither does the government provide free healthcare, nor
is there such a clash between insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies. Thus, despite having similar legislation; one cannot rely on Europe and the
United States of America for jurisprudence on the principles of IPR and their
nexus with competition law in the healthcare industry in India.
Mr. Murali Neelakantan stated that IPR were not to be seen as natural rights,
and according to him, the source of such rights was a worry. He questioned
whether IPR were essential for innovation. It is widely believed that these rights
are indeed essential for innovation, a notion with which Mr. Neelakantan disagreed. A consequence of this widely held belief is that IPR gets special status in
competition law. Mr. Neelakantan said that IPRs must be considered differently
for the purposes of the Competition Act. There is a tremendous impact of this
unique treatment of IPR in the healthcare industry, where these rights are especially valuable.
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Mr. Neelakantan opined that it was essential to understand the definition of a
market, a conundrum in competition law with which India had so far had a bad
run - most notably with the Coca Cola and the Hiranandanicase. The former
asserted that a multiplex could not constitute a market in and of itself, despite
the fact that it was a highly limiting one, once you were in it. The latter case
held that a hospital is not considered to be a limiting market or a monopoly, as
there was plenty of choice in that respect. The medical market works by virtue
of doctors prescribing branded medicines to patients who trust them implicitly.
The pharmacist however, could very well substitute a medicine of a different
brand - the assertion being of course, that the impact of brands on competition
is immense. Trademarks allow a manufacturer to distinguish his goods, and allow
the producer to assert his or her right over that good and proclaim to all consumers that it was indeed him or her who made the good. Patients are unaware
as to the technicalities of the variety of drugs available and blindly trust their
healthcare officials as to the propriety of the medication that they receive - allowing for the possibility of intervention by the pharmacist, substituting the aspirin
prescribed for Paracetamol. While this may not seem as egregious to a consumer
who needs the medicine for a simple cold, it definitely is harmful for a heart
patient who needs the aspirin as a blood thinner.
Mr. Neelakantan argued that one was effectively granted an infinite monopoly if one held patents. One would have exclusive rights over production of the
drug for twenty years, and by the time that period elapses; it becomes a standard. Prescription of that standard drug becomes a necessity, and despite a generic
brand being the exact same medicine - doctors would prefer that which they have
constantly prescribed with great success over the past twenty years. As a result,
there is no way for a new competitor to enter into the market because it has for
twenty years been dominated by one company. This domination extended into
the twenty first year simply by means of convenience and experience of the doctor. This skewed the market in favour of companies holding these patents, and
according to Mr. Neelakantan could lead to misuses of the brand as well.
Mr. Neelakantan offered the solution of calling a drug by its chemical name
as well as the name of the company - for example, Aspirin by Cipla. This would
both secure the identifiability of the product and assert its difference from other
drugs purporting similar effects. This is a remedy to this uniquely Indian problem, which arises only because of how the market operates.
With that, Mr. Neelakantan moved to his next issue, that of regulatory nexus.
Competition law looks beyond what is legal in other statutes. Something can be
perfectly legal and allowed by legislation - but something may also be anti-competitive and consequentially, illegal according to competition law. Citing the
AstraZeneca case, Mr. Neelakantan emphasized that a product from the market
was withdrawn just before the patent expiry. Since the law required competitors to have up to date data, and nobody had it presently, this was held to be
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anti-competitive. The same practice is commonly followed in the US, where it
is called 'evergreening'. It essentially allows a competitor to dominate the market forever. Thus, the top six players in the insulin market have not changed and
indeed will not change, as competition law policies and practices such as evergreening are the cause of the same. Intellectual Property law has been unable
to anticipate this, and offers the meek defense of claiming that the Patent Act
is self-contained and hence a challenge will be valid only under compulsory
licensing or government licensing. While each patent individually may not be
anti-competitive, it is important to realize that a combination of such patents may
indeed be so, and thus require licensing.
Mr. Neelakantan thereafter proceeded to outline the possible defenses that
were going to be taken in such cases, the first being based on the Oil Companies'
case, where it was held that there was no cartelization despite clear price parallelism. The defense was that since pricing is regulated by the government, it cannot
possibly be a cartel. Similarly, drug companies will assert that they are bound
by the government to have a price ceiling; and thus the government is managing competition personally. They are thus exempt from the remaining aspects of
competition law. Mr. Neelakantan responded to that by saying that the 400 drugs
regulated by the drug price control order were all for common ailments. This
was what the government seemed to be bothered by - they did not cover cancer,
tuberculosis or diabetes, which were real examples of cases where high pricing of
drugs could be fatal. According to Mr. Neelakantan, this was what really needed
to be regulated.
The question thus becomes - what exactly is the role of the government? Is it
enough to say that a practice is anti-competitive? If the government intervenes in
the market, should it not also intervene in healthcare? The government is capable
of intervening, but it does not. He drew an analogy to the example of condoms.
India is the world's largest producer of condoms, and they're available for free
across the world. Hindustan Unilever tenders for Brazil, at below cost, and sells it
there. The government itself buys at above cost, because of which the government
skews the market. The sectors too may be separate - some condoms are free, and
others are not.
With this, Mr. Rohan Arora invited the next speaker, Mr. Paramjeet Berwal,
Partner, Inkstone to take the floor.
Mr. Berwal said that IPR were not merely an incentive to innovate, but a
tool to commercialize innovation. He believed that while theoretically many of
these rights revolved around people, practically they seemed to only pander to
the needs and requirements of companies. Dynamic competition is much better and more important than static competition, and in the United States the 14th
Amendment exists to protect IPR. A majority of the cases filed to secure this
provision were filed by corporations. Mr. Berwal made an interesting argument
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regarding how we as consumers constantly infringe IPRs, which is evidenced by
virtue of almost 96% of music, downloaded online being done so illegally.
He then went on to hypothesize that competition law has vested corporate
interests as well. According to him, the cost of medicine is high because patents keep it so - which excludes those who have greater need for the same. As
to the argument that IPR supports innovation, he asserted that innovation existed
and thrived much before the concept of IPR, and put forth an intriguing question
regarding why competition law supports intellectual property rights.
Mr. J Sai Deepak, Associate Partner, Saikrishna & Associates proceeded to
take the floor after this.
Mr. Sai Deepak started out by admitting that he was the person handling
the Avicromax case, which meant his views were in fact likely to be biased. He
then stated that the interplay between IPR and competition plays out most in the
Patents Act, which was what he was going to focus on.
Section 3(5) of the Competition Act carves out an exception for IPR. Mr.
Sai Deepak said that from a practical standpoint, it was being argued in Court
that according to the Competition Act, the moment a certain act goes beyond
reasonable, one was now no longer exempt from competition. Now, even if this
exception had not been carved out, through application of general logic this
fact would still apply. Therefore it does not offer significant amount of protection. Moreover, he pointed out that Section 4 of the Competition Act has no such
exception. That means that Intellectual Property still exists within purview of
abuse of dominance. There is no protection whatsoever under Section 4, leaving
any conduct under Section 4 extremely prone to scrutiny.
Section 19(4)(g) spells out those factors which need to be considered while
looking at dominance. It speaks of monopolies, and it does not exclude IPR.
Consequently, the conduct of a patentee if she assumes dominance because either
she has a patent or simply because she is in a dominant market position is very
prone to scrutiny. Sections 21 and 21A try to deal with conflict between multiple
regulators. What if there is a more specific regulator, but the matter also comes
within the purview of the Competition Commission? Mr. Sai Deepak said that
the Commission did have quite a broad mandate in terms of dealing with competition. After all, Section 27 spells out extensive powers that the Commission
has when it comes to dealing with abuse of dominance. Further, Section 60 of the
Competition Act has an overriding effect on any legislation it is in conflict with.
Section 62, on the other hand, tries to harmonise, saying the act shall not be in
derogation of and in addition to other legislations. While this may seem conflicting at first, it is not so. When looking at the conflict between the Competition Act
and the Patents Act, this works out perfectly.
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Mr. Sai Deepak noted that Section 84(1)(B) of the Patents Act speaks of reasonable affordability. That and the proscription on unfair pricing relate to the
same issue, though they are under different legislations. They are differently
worded too, leading to slightly differing standards in both cases. Therefore, a patent must not only be reasonably affordable under the Patents Act, but also fairly
priced under Competition Act. He said that these were two different standards
which must be fulfilled. Mr. Sai Deepak moved on to Section 90(1), which mandates the grant of a compulsory license to quash an anti-competitive practice
which has been adjudicated upon by a third party. All the provisions which deal
with the controller's powers specifically do not vest in her the power to deal with
anti-competitive practices. Her jurisdiction has been ousted by virtue of the fact
that it has not been explicitly vested.
Mr. Sai Deepak then addressed Section 83(f) of the Patents Act, which provides the factors which must be considered while granting a license, and abuse
of patent rights. This is differentiable from abuse of dominance or market power.
One might be in violation of the Competition Act, but not the Patents Act. Such
violations are not mutually exclusive.
He then considered Section 93, which provides that any license granted is
only granted as an inter-se license. It is treated as a voluntary license, though it
is compulsory, leaving a holder in a position where she can be prosecuted as a
voluntary license holder as well as be punished as a compulsory license holder,
which was in his opinion an extremely unfortunate position of law.
Mr. Sai Deepak then referred to the Raghavan Committee report, which envisaged tension between IPR and competition, and therefore said that the competition legislation would have to address distortion of the competition mechanism
by users of IPR. He then gave an example. Let us assume R is an owner. J has
a problem with his conduct in that he is secretive and does not give J the information she wants as a potential licensee. J also has a problem with the payout
which she is expected to give. Under the Competition Act, the focus will be on
the asymmetry of information being used to R's advantage, and thus elements of
the essential elements doctrine will be brought in. R says he doesn't have a viable
alternative. In exploitative abuse, if the Competition Commission is deemed as
having the power to actually fix prices, there is no need to go to the controller of
patents, as the aspect of actual payment is also addressed by the Commission.
Mr. Sai Deepak noted that according to the Commission, though the abuse of
dominance had been dealt with, corollary power of price fixation had not been
expressly given to them, and thus they ought not to deal with price fixation. In
that case, the Commission, under Section 18, would formulate those parameters
which enabled a better placed authority to come up with prices and royalty payments. It might have ruled something as unfair, but what price was actually fair
might be sent to the Controller of Patents under Section 21A. They might also
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set guidelines allowing parties themselves to decide on what a fair price was, by
simulating a negotiation environment between parties.
According to him, from a policy point of view, Section 60's overriding power
was given. Generally, special law takes precedence over general laws. The
Commission continues to be the master regulator when it comes to anything
under competition. Since Section 60 ousts other authorities, but the Patents Act
does not, and there is no express vesting in the Patents Act but it does exist
in the Competition Act, the Competition Act clearly takes precedence over the
Patents Act. Any kind of conflict of jurisdiction between the Controller of Patents
and Competition Act was therefore merely illusory.
Mr. Sai Deepak opined that should the Commission choose to fix prices, it
could legally justify it. Certainly they would be the better authority in a general economic sense. However, some issues are hyper-technical. Under Section
21, they could interact with regulators and consult them as part of the process of
coming to a decision. The procedural framework is not rigid but malleable. He
believed that the Competition Act is clear in express statements, and the Patent
Act was clear in its loud silence, thereby facilitating cooperation and interaction
between the two.
Mr. Sai Deepak then examined static and dynamic competition. In static competition, there is no monopoly on rights, and thus competition is merely on quality of products, assuming only a limited scope for innovation exists. The focus is
on pricing and marketing. In dynamic competition, parties compete not just on
price, but also on quality of product and efficiency. They innovate, and are given
a certain monopoly in return for this innovation. This is a way of incentivizing
third parties to innovate.
Mr. Sai Deepak pointed out that Indian innovation is extremely underdeveloped. Disputes involve issues such as rights over the shape of spoons! It is
thus premature for us to introduce advanced rights-based models without even
reaching that level. He proceeded to observe that innovation, however, is often
incremental, not large. He stated that presently, there is a thicket of regulatory
framework which acts as an entry barrier. Clarity as to the laws allows the parties to know whom to approach, and to know what lines to not cross.
Finally, Mr. Sai Deepak observed that the civil suit proceedings for infringement and royalty fixation are also important. When the court is arriving at licensing fees and damages, they need to do a FRAND analysis but whether they
have to a competition law analysis is still open. He observed that civil courts in
India do not have the right to look at aspects such as the abuse of dominance.
Therefore, the limited power of civil courts too does not take away in any way
from the Commission's authority. Further, any person can initiate proceedings
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under Section 19, which reflects the Competition Commission's incredible
authority.
Mr. Rohan Arora thanked Mr. Deepak for his speech, and concurred, saying
that the Commission is not a regulator so much as it is an authority. He then
introduced Dr. Murthy, Patent Counsel, Intel, who was the final speaker for the
session.
Dr. Murthy began his speech by questioning the real difference between conventional patents and standard essential patents ("SEPS"). He pointed out that
if one looks at the Supreme Court rulings on this point, then differentiation
between conventional patents and SEPs is difficult.
Dr. Murthy said that the US has had a massive influence on the Indian judiciary. Earlier, it was very difficult for a patent holder to get an injunction. Now,
it isn't difficult at all. Dr. Murthy explained the reason he believed SEPs are different from conventional patents. In conventional patents, if one comes up with
an innovation, and if the patent office is satisfied, a patent is granted. If a license
is not granted, then in that case one can only come up with better inventions to
solve the problem and then get a license. In SEPs, though, when there is a problem pertaining to a standard setting problem, there are always multiple possible
solutions. If one certain solution is chosen, it becomes a standard. Irrespective
of the technical specifications and qualitative superiority of other solutions, they
become unviable simply because they are not the standard any more. Ultimately,
the holder of the patent, which is deemed to be an SEP, is automatically put in a
position of dominance.
Dr. Murthy said that as an inventor, he has invested a lot in his technology.
His objective has been to make it a standard, leading to massive market returns
if it becomes a standard. But just because he has accomplished that, does it mean
that he should now be free from control? SEPs, despite having wide market
access, end up enjoying almost unfettered access.
Dr Murthy pointed out that organisations are able to claim a large amount of
revenue on a much larger unit than the actual deemed unit. Rather than take royalty on the cost of the camera, if an SEP enables better camera phones, companies end up trying to get royalty on the cost of the camera phone in totality. This
makes massive economic sense for such companies, and is not properly regulated.
Producing companies are left with not much choice, for the product is a standard,
leaving them practically held at ransom.
Dr. Murthy addressed the arguments which were made that this exists as an
industry standard. He argues that just being a standard does not justify it. What
is wrong is wrong, even if it has been in used for decades. A wi-fi chip manufacturer should not be able to grant licenses only when they are able to get royalty
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on the entire operating system or product as that would not be right. Moreover,
with the number of SEPs which go into every product, one ends up in a position
where it might become economically unviable for a product manufacturer to manufacture her product at all.
Moreover, he argued that SEP holders should not be allowed to selectively
refuse for the simple reason that they will earn a lesser amount of royalty if they
are selling to component manufacturers as opposed to general manufacturers.
Also, someone holding a large number of SEPs can also charge a large amount
for non-SEPs, using the SEPs as a form of ransom. Another way one can use
SEPs is to trade them for products. One may not be willing to sell one's 3G chips
(which are one's SEPs) unless one gives the rights to use of the SEP as well. Dr.
Murthy said that Intel is often both SEP holder and standard implementer. There
must be a balance maintained between the interests of the two.
Dr. Murthy then considered reasonably royalty. As it stands now, there is no
straightforward mathematical expression to calculate reasonable royalty. Often,
the royalty expected by SEP holders has been held to be unreasonable by Courts,
such as in the case of Nokia v. Motorola. The reasonable royalty there was
pegged down from four billion dollars to 1.8 billion dollars.
Dr. Murthy finally argued that it is unreasonable to expect SEP holders and
standards implementers to reach a median on their own, and he blamed human
nature for that. They might negotiate for the sake of negotiating, but then necessarily end up asking for injunctions. The judiciary too ends up granting injunctions, even to SEP holders. Injunctions cannot be granted simply from a very
rudimentary look at the law, without understanding and analyzing the real life
consequences for companies. He said such injunctions ought to be taken off the
table. If the negotiation fails, then arbitration may be considered.

